XEP-0373: OpenPGP for XMPP

Abstract:Specifies end-to-end encryption and authentication of data with the help of OpenPGP, announcement, discovery and retrieval of public keys and a mechanism to synchronize secret keys over multiple devices.
Authors:Florian Schmaus, Dominik Schürmann, Vincent Breitmoser
Copyright:© 1999 - 2016 XMPP Standards Foundation. SEE LEGAL NOTICES.
Status:Experimental
Type:Standards Track
Version:0.1
Last Updated:2016-05-10

WARNING: This Standards-Track document is Experimental. Publication as an XMPP Extension Protocol does not imply approval of this proposal by the XMPP Standards Foundation. Implementation of the protocol described herein is encouraged in exploratory implementations, but production systems are advised to carefully consider whether it is appropriate to deploy implementations of this protocol before it advances to a status of Draft.


Table of Contents


1. Introduction
2. Glossary
3. OpenPGP Encrypted and Signed Data
    3.1. Exchanging OpenPGP Encrypted and Signed Data
    3.2. Verification of <openpgp/> Content
4. Announcing and Discovering the Public Key via PEP
    4.1. Announcing the Public Key via PEP
    4.2. Discovering the Public Key via PEP
5. Synchronizing the Secret Key with a Private PEP Node
    5.1. Required PEP features
       5.1.1. Discovering support
    5.2. Requesting Information About the Secret Key PEP Node
       5.2.1. Client Sends Request
       5.2.2. PEP Service Success Response
       5.2.3. PEP Node Does Not Exist Response
       5.2.4. PEP Not Supported
    5.3. Creating the Secret Key PEP Node
6. Business Rules
    6.1. OpenPGP Packet Format Version Restriction
7. Implementors Advice
    7.1. Design Principles and Techniques
    7.2. Stanza Size
    7.3. XMPP Address Normalization
8. Rationale
    8.1. Key Handling
    8.2. OpenPGP Element and Content Element Design
    8.3. Addressing the Issues and Problems of XEP-0027
    8.4. Not using OpenPGP ASCII Armor
    8.5. OpenPGP User IDs
9. Security Considerations
10. IANA Considerations
11. XMPP Registrar Considerations
    11.1. Protocol Namespaces
12. XML Schema
13. Acknowledgements

Appendices
    A: Document Information
    B: Author Information
    C: Legal Notices
    D: Relation to XMPP
    E: Discussion Venue
    F: Requirements Conformance
    G: Notes
    H: Revision History


1. Introduction

This XMPP extension protocol specifies the foundations of end-to-end encryption and authentication, based on digital signatures, of data with the help of OpenPGP. Additional XEPs will use this extension protocol as building block when specifying their own OpenPGP profile suiting their use case. One such profile is the Instant Messaging Profile specified in OpenPGP for XMPP Instant Messaging (XEP-0374) [1].

XMPP provides the mechanisms to solve a lot of issues that come with modern day OpenPGP usage. For example, based on Personal Eventing Protocol (XEP-0163) [2] this specification describes a standardized way to discover OpenPGP public keys of other entities. But unlike the OpenPGP keyservers, this process establishes a strong relation between the key and the key's owning entity (usually a human user). A similar mechanism described herein allows to synchronize the secret key(s) across multiple devices.

OpenPGP in return allows for end-to-end encrypted data to be exchanged between one, two or even multiple entities (multi-end-to-multi-end encryption). Therefore this XEP can be used for example to implement end-to-end encrypted Multi-User Chat (XEP-0045) [3].

2. Glossary

OpenPGP element
An XMPP extension element: <openpgp/> qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace
OpenPGP content element
An element embedded via OpenPGP in a <openpgp/> element. Either one of <signcrypt/>, <sign/> or <crypt/>, qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace.
PEP
Personal Eventing Protocol (XEP-0163)
Public key PEP node
A PEP node containing an entity's public OpenPGP key.
Secret key PEP node
A PEP node containing an entity's encrypted secret OpenPGP key.

3. OpenPGP Encrypted and Signed Data

3.1 Exchanging OpenPGP Encrypted and Signed Data

The <openpgp/> extension element qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace is used in order to exchange encrypted and signed data.

Example 1. The <openpgp/> extension within a message.

<message to='juliet@example.org'>
  <openpgp xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
    BASE64_OPENPGP_MESSAGE
  </openpgp>
</message>

The text content of <openpgp/> ("BASE64_OPENPGP_MESSAGE") is a Base64 encoded (RFC 4648 [4] § 4) OpenPGP message as specified in RFC 4880 [5] which contains an encrypted and/or signed UTF-8 (RFC 3629 [6]) encoded string. This string MUST correspond to exactly one OpenPGP content element, that is, it represents either a <signcrypt/>, a <sign/> or a <crypt/> extension element qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace. Note that OpenPGP's ASCII Armor is not used, instead the XMPP client MUST encode the raw bytes of OpenPGP message using Base64.

In case of a <signcrypt/> element, the OpenPGP message embedded in the <openpgp/> element MUST be encrypted and signed, and SHOULD also be encrypted to self. In case of a <sign/> element, the OpenPGP message MUST be signed and MUST NOT be encrypted. In case of <crypt/> the OpenPGP message MUST NOT be signed, but MUST be encrypted.

Example 2. The <signcrypt/> extension element.

<signcrypt xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
  <to jid='juliet@example.org'/>
  <time stamp='2014-07-10T17:06:00+02:00'/>
  <rpad>
    f0rm1l4n4-mT8y33j!Y%fRSrcd^ZE4Q7VDt1L%WEgR!kv
  </rpad>
  <payload>
    <body xmlns='jabber:client'>
      This is a secret message.
    </body>
  </payload>
</signcrypt>

OpenPGP content elements MUST possess exactly one 'time' element as direct child elements. The <signcrypt/> and <crypt/> content elements MUST contain at least one 'to' element(s), which MUST have a 'jid' attribute containing the intended recipient's XMPP address of the signed and/or encrypted data to prevent Surreptitious Forward Attacks [7]. The XMPP address found in the 'to' element's 'jid' attribute SHOULD be without Resourcepart (i.e., a bare JID). A <sign/> content element may not carry a 'to' attribute. The 'time' element MUST have a 'stamp' attribute which contains the timestamp when the OpenPGP content element was signed and/or encrypted in the DateTime format as specified in XMPP Date and Time Profiles (XEP-0082) [8] § 3.2. The <signcrypt/> and <crypt/> elements SHOULD furthermore contain a 'rpad' element which text content is a random-length random-content padding.

Table 1: OpenPGP Content Element Properties

Content Element 'to' Element 'time' Element <rpad/> Element <payload/> Element
<signcrypt/> MUST have at least one MUST have exactly one SHOULD have exaclty one MUST have exactly one
<sign/> MAY NOT contain one MUST have exaclty one NOT REQUIRED MUST have exactly one
<crypt/> MUST have at least one MUST have exaclty one SHOULD have exaclty one MUST have exactly one

OpenPGP content elements MUST possess exactly one <payload/> element. The child elements of <payload/> can be seen as OpenPGP secured Stanza extension elements which are encrypted and/or signed. After the <openpgp/> element and the including <signcrypt/>, <sign/> or <crypt/> element was verified, they are processed according to the specification of the relevant OpenPGP for XMPP profile (see for example OpenPGP for XMPP Instant Messaging (XEP-0374) [9]).

3.2 Verification of <openpgp/> Content

Recipients MUST verify that the signature is valid, that the signature's key corresponds to the sender's key, and that the sender's key has a User ID containing the sender's XMPP address in the form "xmpp:juliet@example.org" (for details see "OpenPGP User IDs"). Thus, the recipient may need to retrieve the key from the Personal Eventing Protocol node as described above. At least one of the XMPP addresses found in the 'to' elements contained in OpenPGP content element MUST correspond to the outer 'to' of the XMPP <message/>. Furthermore, recipients are RECOMMENDED to verify the 'time' element for plausibility or to display it to a user for verification.

4. Announcing and Discovering the Public Key via PEP

Parties interested in exchanging encrypted data between each other via OpenPGP need to know the public key(s) of the recipients. The following section specifies a mechanism to announce and discover public keys.

4.1 Announcing the Public Key via PEP

In order to announce the public key, the client needs to store it in a PEP node. The public key data, as specified in RFC 4880, is stored within a <pubkey/> element which is a child element of the <pubkeys/> element qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace. Note that OpenPGP's ASCII Armor is not used, instead the XMPP client MUST encode the public key using Base64. Client SHOULD only try to store the public key if the Personal Eventing Protocol service supports persistent-items, thus it SHOULD check if the service reports the 'http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#persistent-items' feature.

Example 3. Saving the public key in the PEP node.

<iq from='juliet@example.org/balcony' type='set' id='1'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
     <publish node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
        <item>
          <pubkeys xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
            <pubkey>
              BASE64_OPENPGP_PUBLIC_KEY
            </pubkey>
          </pubkeys>
         </item>
      </publish>
    </pubsub>
</iq>

4.2 Discovering the Public Key via PEP

In order to discover the public key of an XMPP entity, clients send a PubSub <iq/> request to the entity's bare JID of which it wants to know the public key.

Example 4. Requesting a OpenPGP public key from an XMPP entity.

<iq from='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    to='juliet@example.org'
    type='get'
    id='getpub'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
    <items node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'
           max_items='1'/>
  </pubsub>
</iq>

Example 5. Personal Eventing Protocol result containing the requested public key.

<iq from='juliet@example.org'
    to='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    type='result'
    id='getpub'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
    <publish node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
      <item>
        <pubkeys xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
          <pubkey>
            BASE64_OPENPGP_PUBLIC_KEY
          </pubkey>
        </pubkeys>
      </item>
    </publish>
  </pubsub>
  </iq>

Note that the result may contain multiple pubkey elements. Only the public keys found in the most recent MUST be used. Requesters may want to limit the results to the most recent item using the 'max_items' attribute set to '1'. Clients could alternatively use Result Set Management (XEP-0059) [10] as an alternative to 'max_items' but accoding to XEP-0060 RSM is not (yet) mandatory for PubSub services.

Some XMPP services may not provide the Personal Eventing Protocol feature required to provide the mechanism described here. If so, they will return an <iq/> error of type service-unavailable.

5. Synchronizing the Secret Key with a Private PEP Node

A private PEP node is used to allow XMPP clients to synchronize the user's secret OpenPGP key. Where private PEP node is defined: A PEP node in whitelist mode where only the bare JID of the key owner is whitelisted as described in Best Practices for Persistent Storage of Private Data via Publish-Subscribe (XEP-0223) [11]. The secret key is additionally encrypted.

5.1 Required PEP features

The used PEP server MUST support PEP and the whitelist access model. It SHOULD also support persistent items.

5.1.1 Discovering support

Example 6. Account owner queries server regarding protocol support

<iq from='juliet@capulet.lit/balcony'
    to='juliet@capulet.lit'
    id='disco1'
    type='get'>
  <query xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/disco#info'/>
</iq>

The service discovery result must contain a PEP identity '<identity category='pubsub' type='pep'/>, and the 'http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#access-whitelist' feature. Ideally it also contains the 'http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#persistent-items' feature

Example 7. Server communicates protocol support

<iq from='juliet@capulet.lit'
    to='juliet@capulet.lit/balcony'
    id='disco1'
    type='result'>
  <query xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/disco#info'>
    <identity category='account' type='registered'/>
    <identity category='pubsub' type='pep'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#access-presence'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#auto-create'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#auto-subscribe'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#config-node'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#create-and-configure'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#create-nodes'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#filtered-notifications'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#persistent-items'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#publish'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#retrieve-items'/>
    <feature var='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#subscribe'/>
    ...
  </query>
</iq>

5.2 Requesting Information About the Secret Key PEP Node

In order to synchronize the secret key over a private PEP node, clients first need to discover and verify the node for the correct settings.

5.2.1 Client Sends Request

Example 8. Requesting the user's secret key.

<iq from='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    to='juliet@example.org'
    type='get'
    id='getsecret'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
    <items node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:secret-key:0'
           max_items='1'/>
  </pubsub>
</iq>

5.2.2 PEP Service Success Response

Example 9. Personal Eventing Protocol result containing the requested public key.

<iq from='juliet@example.org'
    to='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    type='result'
    id='getsecret'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
    <publish node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:secret-key:0'>
      <item>
        <secretkey xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>
            BASE64_OPENPGP_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_KEY
        </secretkey>
      </item>
    </publish>
  </pubsub>
</iq>

5.2.3 PEP Node Does Not Exist Response

If the node does not exist the service will return an <iq/> error indicating the item-not-found error condition. The client MUST then create it with an whitelist access model.

Example 10. Node does not exist

<iq from='juliet@example.org'
    to='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    type='error'
    id='getsecret'>
  <error type='cancel'>
    <item-not-found xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
  </error>
</iq>

5.2.4 PEP Not Supported

The service will return a service-unavailable error <iq/> if it does not support PEP.

Example 11. Node does not exist

<iq from='juliet@example.org'
    to='romeo@example.org/orchard'
    type='error'
    id='getsecret'>
  <error type='cancel'>
    <service-unavailable xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
  </error>
</iq>

5.3 Creating the Secret Key PEP Node

Example 12. Client creates secret key PEP node

<iq type='set'
    from='juliet@example.org/balcony'
    id='create-node'>
  <pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
    <create node='urn:xmpp:openpgp:secret-key:0'/>
    <configure>
      <x xmlns='jabber:x:data' type='submit'>
        <field var='FORM_TYPE' type='hidden'>
          <value>http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub#node_config</value>
        </field>
        <field var='pubsub#access_model'>
          <value>whitelist</value>
        </field>
      </x>
    </configure>
  </pubsub>
</iq>

Example 13. Service informs requesting entity of success

<iq type='result'
    to='juliet@example.org/balcony'
    id='create-node'/>

The node is now created and the only affiliated entity is the bare JID of the user, who created the node, with an affiliation as 'owner'.

In order to set a new secret key, clients store the encrypted secret key as Base64 encoded raw OpenPGP message within an <secretkey/> element qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' namespace. These secret key backups are created as follows:

  1. All secret keys that should be included in the backup MUST be concatenated in their transferable key format (RFC 4880 § 11.1).
  2. A backup code is generated from secure random: The backup code consists of 24 upper case characters from the Latin alphabet and numbers without 'O' ("LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O") and '0' ("DIGIT ZERO") (alphabet: 123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ) grouped into 4-character chunks, e.g., TWNK-KD5Y-MT3T-E1GS-DRDB-KVTW. The characters MUST be generated from cryptographically secure random. For example getrandom(2), SecureRandom or /dev/urandom. More information about the randomness requirements for security can be found in RFC 4086 [12]
  3. The whole backup code including the dashes is directly used as a string to encrypt the concatenated transferable keys as an OpenPGP message. More precisely: It is used as the symmetric-key for a Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet according to RFC 4880 § 5.3; the symmetric-key is thus 29 characters long including the dashes. The encryption algorithm MUST be one of the standardized OpenPGP symmetric algorithms, e.g, AES-128.

6. Business Rules

6.1 OpenPGP Packet Format Version Restriction

Implementations of this XEP MUST generate and accept only version 4 (or higher) OpenPGP packets. Lower version OpenPGP packets are insecure in many aspects (see for example RFC 4880 § 5.5.2.).

7. Implementors Advice

7.1 Design Principles and Techniques

OpenPGP implementations have a sad history of being not very user-friendly which results in users either not using OpenPGP or in users wrongly using OpenPGP. Implementors of this XEP, and additional future XEPs based on this XEP, therefore should read STEED [13] and "Why Johnny can't encrypt" [14]. Implementors of this XEP are encouraged to provide the concepts described in STEED:

Furthermore implementors should design the user interface for effective security by following the design principles and techniques for security mentioned in "Why Johnny Can't Encrypt".

7.2 Stanza Size

Implementors should be aware that the size OpenPGP public and secret keys is somewhere in the range of tens of kilobytes. Applying Base64 encoding on keys, as it is described herein, further increases the size. The formula to determine the Base64 encoded size is: ceil(bytes / 3) * 4. Thus the lower bound for the maximum stanza size of 10000 bytes, as specified in RFC 6120 § 13.12. 4., is usually exceeded. However all XMPP server implementations, the authors are aware of, follow the recommendation of the RFC and do not blindly set the maximum stanza size to such a low value, but use a much higher threshold. Therefore, this should hardly be an issue for implementations. Nevertheless, it is advised to keep the size of OpenPGP keys small by removing all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each User ID before exporting the key (cf. GnuPG's --export-options=export-minimal). In addition, implementors are advised to handle <policy-violation/> error responses when trying to transmit Base64 encoded keys.

7.3 XMPP Address Normalization

The format of XMPP addresses, sometimes called JIDs, is well defined. Thus they need to be normalized, as defined in RFC 7622 [15]. When implementations are required to compare XMPP addresses for equality, as it is the case in "Verification of <openpgp/> Content", then they also have to compare the normalized versions of the addresses.

8. Rationale

8.1 Key Handling

This specification intentionally does not specify if the used OpenPGP key should be a primary key or a subkey. It is even possible to announce multiple public keys in the Personal Eventing Protocol node. Implementations MUST be prepared to find multiple public keys. The authors however believe that for ease of use only one OpenPGP key specially crafted for the XMPP use case should be created, announced and used.

8.2 OpenPGP Element and Content Element Design

The <openpgp/> and OpenPGP content elements are container elements for arbitrary signed and encrypted data and can thus act as building blocks for encrypted data included in Message, IQ and Presence stanzas. For example, future specifications may use them to implement encrypted versions of In-Band Bytestreams (XEP-0047) [16] or Jingle In-Band Bytestreams Transport Method (XEP-0261) [17].

Note that signed OpenPGP messages already contain a timestamp as per the OpenPGP specification. OpenPGP content elements nevertheless require the 'time' element because not every OpenPGP API may provide access to the embedded OpenPGP timestamp.

The 'rpad' element of the OpenPGP content elements exists to prevent length-base side channel attacks.

8.3 Addressing the Issues and Problems of XEP-0027

This specification addresses all relevant issues of Current Jabber OpenPGP Usage (XEP-0027) [18] (§ 4, § 5). It mitigates replay attacks by including the recipient's address and a timestamp in the OpenPGP content element [19]. It allows for both, signing and encrypting of the element. The scope of the specification was deliberately limited to OpenPGP.

Features like signed presences, which is provided by XEP-0027, may be added later on as add-on XEP to this.

8.4 Not using OpenPGP ASCII Armor

We decided against OpenPGP ASCII Armor (which contains an additional checksum) and in favor for Base64, because encoding should be part of the network application rather than the crypto layer. Also XMPP, needs no additional error correction of payload. In "MIME Security with OpenPGP" (RFC 3156 [20]), ASCII Armor has only been chosen to be backwards compatible with legacy applications supporting non-MIME OpenPGP emails only.

8.5 OpenPGP User IDs

OpenPGP User IDs normally consist of a name - email address pair, e.g., "Juliet <juliet@example.org>" (RFC 4880 [21] § 5.11). For this XEP, we require User IDs of the format "xmpp:juliet@example.org". First, it is required to have at least one User ID indicating the use of this OpenPGP key. When doing certification of keys (key signing), the partner must know what User ID she actually certifies. Second, this format uses the standardized URI from XEP-0147 to indicate that this User ID corresponds to a key that is used for XMPP. Third, having the Real Name inside provides no additional security or guideline if this key should be certified. The XMPP address is the only trust anchor here.

9. Security Considerations

The scope of this XEP is intentionally limited, so that the specification just defines way for XMPP entities to discover, announce and synchronize OpenPGP keys, and how to exchange signed and encrypted data between two or more parties. Everything else is outside its scope. For example, how 'secure' the key material is protected on the endpoints is up to the implementation.

And while this XEP specifies a mechanism how to discover and retrieve a public key, it does not define how the trust relation to this key should be established. Even if key discovery and retrieval over XMPP provides a stronger coupling between the possessing entity (the XMPP address) and the key, as compared to the OpenPGP keyservers, how a XMPP server authenticates a remote server is a server policy, which does vary from server to server. Implementation MUST provide a way for the user to establish and assign trust to a public key. For example by using a QR code shown on the recipient's device screen.

Besides the protocol defined herein, OpenPGP implementations are another big attack surface. Needless to say that the security of encrypted data exchanged using this protocol depends on the security of the used OpenPGP implementation. It is strongly RECOMMENED to use existing implementations instead of writing your own. OpenPGP implementations have suffered from various vulnerabilities in the past which opened up DoS attack vectors. For example CVE-2013-4402 and CVE-2014-4717.

10. IANA Considerations

This document requires no interaction with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [22].

11. XMPP Registrar Considerations

11.1 Protocol Namespaces

The XMPP Registrar [23] includes 'urn:xmpp:openpgp:0' in its registry of protocol namespaces (see <http://xmpp.org/registrar/namespaces.html>).

12. XML Schema

TODO: Add after the XEP leaves the 'experimental' state.

13. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Emmanuel Gil Peyrot, Sergei Golovan, Marc Laporte, Georg Lukas and Adithya Abraham Philip for their feedback.

The first draft of this specification was worked out and written on the wall of the 'Kymera' room in one of Google's buildings by the authors, consisting of members of the XMPP Standards Foundation and the OpenKeychain project, at the GSOC Mentors Summit 2015. The authors would like to thank Google for making it possible by bringing the right people together.


Appendices


Appendix A: Document Information

Series: XEP
Number: 0373
Publisher: XMPP Standards Foundation
Status: Experimental
Type: Standards Track
Version: 0.1
Last Updated: 2016-05-10
Approving Body: XMPP Council
Dependencies: XMPP Core, XEP-0030, XEP-0082, XEP-0163, XEP-0223, XEP-0334
Supersedes: None
Superseded By: None
Short Name: ox
Source Control: HTML
This document in other formats: XML  PDF


Appendix B: Author Information

Florian Schmaus

Email: flo@geekplace.eu
JabberID: flo@geekplace.eu

Dominik Schürmann

Email: dominik@dominikschuermann.de
JabberID: dominik@dominikschuermann.de

Vincent Breitmoser

Email: look@my.amazin.horse
JabberID: valodim@stratum0.org


Appendix C: Legal Notices

Copyright

This XMPP Extension Protocol is copyright (c) 1999 - 2016 by the XMPP Standards Foundation (XSF).

Permissions

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this specification (the "Specification"), to make use of the Specification without restriction, including without limitation the rights to implement the Specification in a software program, deploy the Specification in a network service, and copy, modify, merge, publish, translate, distribute, sublicense, or sell copies of the Specification, and to permit persons to whom the Specification is furnished to do so, subject to the condition that the foregoing copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Specification. Unless separate permission is granted, modified works that are redistributed shall not contain misleading information regarding the authors, title, number, or publisher of the Specification, and shall not claim endorsement of the modified works by the authors, any organization or project to which the authors belong, or the XMPP Standards Foundation.

Disclaimer of Warranty

## NOTE WELL: This Specification is provided on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, express or implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions of TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. In no event shall the XMPP Standards Foundation or the authors of this Specification be liable for any claim, damages, or other liability, whether in an action of contract, tort, or otherwise, arising from, out of, or in connection with the Specification or the implementation, deployment, or other use of the Specification. ##

Limitation of Liability

In no event and under no legal theory, whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise, unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall the XMPP Standards Foundation or any author of this Specification be liable for damages, including any direct, indirect, special, incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising out of the use or inability to use the Specification (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill, work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all other commercial damages or losses), even if the XMPP Standards Foundation or such author has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

IPR Conformance

This XMPP Extension Protocol has been contributed in full conformance with the XSF's Intellectual Property Rights Policy (a copy of which may be found at <http://xmpp.org/extensions/ipr-policy.shtml> or obtained by writing to XSF, P.O. Box 1641, Denver, CO 80201 USA).

Appendix D: Relation to XMPP

The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined in the XMPP Core (RFC 6120) and XMPP IM (RFC 6121) specifications contributed by the XMPP Standards Foundation to the Internet Standards Process, which is managed by the Internet Engineering Task Force in accordance with RFC 2026. Any protocol defined in this document has been developed outside the Internet Standards Process and is to be understood as an extension to XMPP rather than as an evolution, development, or modification of XMPP itself.


Appendix E: Discussion Venue

The primary venue for discussion of XMPP Extension Protocols is the <standards@xmpp.org> discussion list.

Discussion on other xmpp.org discussion lists might also be appropriate; see <http://xmpp.org/about/discuss.shtml> for a complete list.

Errata can be sent to <editor@xmpp.org>.


Appendix F: Requirements Conformance

The following requirements keywords as used in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119: "MUST", "SHALL", "REQUIRED"; "MUST NOT", "SHALL NOT"; "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED"; "SHOULD NOT", "NOT RECOMMENDED"; "MAY", "OPTIONAL".


Appendix G: Notes

1. XEP-0374: OpenPGP for XMPP Instant Messaging <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0374.html>.

2. XEP-0163: Personal Eventing Protocol <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0163.html>.

3. XEP-0045: Multi-User Chat <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html>.

4. RFC 4648: The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648>.

5. RFC 4880: OpenPGP Message Format <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880>.

6. RFC 3629: UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3629>.

7. Jee Hea An, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Tal Rabin. 2002. On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption. In Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT '02), Lars R. Knudsen (Ed.). Springer-Verlag, London, UK, UK, 83-107. <https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2002/23320080/adr.pdf>

8. XEP-0082: XMPP Date and Time Profiles <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0082.html>.

9. XEP-0374: OpenPGP for XMPP Instant Messaging <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0374.html>.

10. XEP-0059: Result Set Management <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0059.html>.

11. XEP-0223: Best Practices for Persistent Storage of Private Data via Publish-Subscribe <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0223.html>.

12. RFC 4086: Randomness Requirements for Security <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4086>.

13. Koch, Werner, and Marcus Brinkman "STEED — Usable End-to-End Encryption", White Paper, g10 GmbH, 2011-10-17. <http://g10code.com/steed.html>

14. Whitten, Alma, and J. Doug Tygar. "Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0." Usenix Security. Vol. 1999. 1999. <https://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Why_Johnny_Cant_Encrypt/OReilly.pdf>

15. RFC 7622: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Address Format <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7622>.

16. XEP-0047: In-Band Bytestreams <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0047.html>.

17. XEP-0261: Jingle In-Band Bytestreams Transport Method <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0261.html>.

18. XEP-0027: Current Jabber OpenPGP Usage <http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0027.html>.

19. Full Replay attack prevention would require a counter based approach.

20. RFC 3156: MIME Security with OpenPGP <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156>.

21. RFC 4880: OpenPGP Message Format <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880>.

22. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the central coordinator for the assignment of unique parameter values for Internet protocols, such as port numbers and URI schemes. For further information, see <http://www.iana.org/>.

23. The XMPP Registrar maintains a list of reserved protocol namespaces as well as registries of parameters used in the context of XMPP extension protocols approved by the XMPP Standards Foundation. For further information, see <http://xmpp.org/registrar/>.


Appendix H: Revision History

Note: Older versions of this specification might be available at http://xmpp.org/extensions/attic/

Version 0.1 (2016-05-10)

Initial published version approved by the XMPP Council.

(XEP Editor (ssw))

Version 0.0.1 (2016-03-25)

First draft.

(fs)

END